1 The extant works bearing an explicit anti-Stoic title are On Stoic Stoics, such as a physicalist approach to psychology and a teleological view of natural entities.4 Whereas it is beyond doubt that the content of Plutarch's and Galen's argument against Stoicism is of great interest for the history of Stoicism in general and for the better understanding of their thoughts in particular, my focus will not be on the content of their attack on Stoicism but on their polemical strategy, and more particularly on their use of quotations. My contention is that both Plutarch's On Stoic Self-Contradictions (henceforth, De Stoic. rep.) and Galen's On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (henceforth, PHP) represent the best instances of a new genre of polemic, based on the accusations of self-contradictions and characterized by an abundant use of the opponent's ipsa verba. These texts thus constitute important milestones in the history of polemics, for they mark the emergence of a new kind of polemic that will be variously adopted and declined in the following decades and centuries.
With a view to identifying the key features of this polemical genre, my analysis will be mostly devoted to Plutarch's De Stoic. rep. First, I will map out the different types of accusations leveled against Chrysippus, and then I will examine the way in which Chrysippus's quotations are employed within this polemical framework. An overview of the parallel strategy used by Galen in his polemic against Chrysippus will enable us to better localize the genre that Plutarch's De Stoic. rep. represents.
Plutarch's On Stoic Self-Contradictions
On Stoic Self-Contradictions (Peri Stōikōn enantiōmatōn) constitutes, with its lost parallel anti-Epicurean tract, an unicum in the history of philosophy. It is entirely devoted to showing that the Stoics, and especially Chrysippus, are guilty of many inconsistencies. The forty-seven chapters cover various topics in ethics, physics, and logic and intend to prove that in all these domains Chrysippus is found faulty of many self-contradictions. Plutarch does not explicitly offer any alternative view to the ones he criticizes, since as he himself states, "my intention is not to examine if they say something wrong, but only how much they say in disagreement with themselves (ὅσα πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς
